

SECRET

DDO MNG

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

MEETING WITH THE
DDO MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP
29 July 1977, 1430-1530

AGENDA

| | SUBJECT | TIME |
|------|--|---------|
| I. | The future mission of the Directorate of Operations within the Intelligence Community | 15 min. |
| II. | FSO cover | 15 min. |
| III. | Voluntary cooperation of U.S. citizens and private companies with the Intelligence Community | 10 min. |
| IV. | The Directorate of Operations personnel evaluation and promotion system | 10 min. |
| V. | General discussion | 10 min. |

SECRET



SECRET

I. SUBJECT: Future role of the Directorate of Operations
within the Intelligence Community

A. DISCUSSION:

1. The Directorate of Operations (DO) has primary responsibility for US clandestine activities abroad.

Intelligence collection is specifically limited to that obtained from clandestine operations or as a byproduct of that assigned function. (NSCID 2 and 5, DCID 2/1)

2. Despite these directives, the Directorate faces an increasing demand from policy makers and other components of the Intelligence Community for intelligence collection on topics which are the responsibility of the Department of State. The Directorate cannot meet these demands for information without extending beyond its assigned functions.

3. It is apparent that the Department of State is unwilling or unable to fulfill its assigned overt collection role to the satisfaction of the Intelligence Community, thus leaving a gap in this coverage.

4. There is divided opinion within the Directorate on accepting additional reporting requirements which draw resources from development of clandestine operations.

25X1

**SECRET**

SECRET

5. The uncertainty within the Directorate on its future role is affecting the morale of both younger and older officers, who hear contradictory views on what our objectives and mission will be.

6. The DCI and DDO expect Station Chiefs to be fully cognizant of internal affairs of the host country and various other targets, yet DDO management objectives generally require Stations to give priority to operations on the USSR and PRC presence. At the same time, resources are declining.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. If not accomplished under PRM/11, the DCI should recommend that the President and NSC redefine the foreign intelligence collection responsibilities of the various members of the community.

Options:


a. Reemphasize the objectives of the DO as being confined to clandestine operations and direct the Department of State to increase its response to Intelligence Community requirements which can be answered by overt collection abroad.

b. Amend the National Security Council Intelligence Directives to formally give the

SECRET

SECRET

25X1



c. Create a new component of the Intelligence Community for all overt foreign intelligence collection in the US and overseas. The component would combine units of the Department of State, Directorate of Operations, and the military services to provide reporting on foreign events through US missions abroad and field offices in the US.

2. Task an element of the Intelligence Community Staff (perhaps the Human Resources Committee or the National Intelligence Officers) or create a new position in the office of the DDO to carefully screen requirements to the Directorate.

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1

[Redacted]

2. By enlisting the cooperation of US citizens, the CIA has created a sizeable public constituency which stands as testimony that the US can maintain an effective foreign intelligence organization which does not compromise the tenets of a free society.

3. Disclosures by Congress and the press have reduced public confidence that CIA can maintain confidentiality of cooperation. This has been cited as a factor in refusals of some individuals and companies to assist in more sensitive operations.

4. Guidelines such as those of Harvard University-- if strictly observed-- effectively limit participation of US academics.

5. Reluctance of Agency officials to approve use of US citizens because of a desire to avoid further disclosures inhibits its intelligence officers from taking new initiatives which might involve the use of US citizens.

SECRET

SECRET

6. Overall reduction of official US presence in many areas of the world would make the CIA more dependent than in the past on private US citizens and companies to help provide information on foreign events and improve the access of CIA officers to intelligence targets.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Within and without the Intelligence Community, reaffirm the right of US citizens to freely participate in the intelligence mission without fear of exposure and/or reprisal. The following measures would help reaffirm that policy:

a. Establish with Congress that a record of an individual's cooperation with the Intelligence Community is a confidential matter not subject to release to other elements of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches without full consent of the individual concerned.

b. Restate the Director's position on the Harvard guidelines to guarantee individual rights in cooperating with CIA.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Alternatives:

- a. Reaffirm the right of US citizens to freely participate, but draw a distinction between those in the academic community and those in business. For contacts in the business community, set policy requiring approval of principal company officials responsible for overseas operations. Contact with academics would not require approval by the academic institution in consonance with traditional academic freedom in the US.
- b. Do nothing to draw public attention to the issue and accept a reduction in citizen participation until Congressional and public scrutiny abates.
- c. Publicly agree to stricter terms on contact with US citizens as an attempt to increase public and Congressional confidence in the Intelligence Community. This would undoubtedly be received publicly as evidence of the CIA "cleaning house."

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

IV. SUBJECT: The Directorate of Operations personnel
evaluation and promotion system

A. DISCUSSION:

1. The DO has a competitive personnel evaluation and promotion system which is considered by some DO employees to be unfair and inadequate. (Note: The DDO/MAG reviewed the evaluation and promotion system recently. Although there are some weaknesses and shortcomings and it is not infallible, we believe it is the fairest and most equitable system to exist in the Directorate thus far.)

2. Some DO employees believe that many personnel are given promotions which are not justified by their performance, while others who perform at a higher level too often are overlooked by the system as it now functions.

3. The largest group of DO officers are "Operations Generalists," i.e., case officers. Here the primary responsibility and goal is recruitment. Many, however, believe that the system overemphasizes the quantity of recruitments and ignores the quality since there is no present way to evaluate the latter factor.

SECRET
10

SECRET

4. The comparative evaluation of officers suffers from the present fitness report system, which remains the primary basis for this evaluation by the panels. The vast majority of officers are rated "Strong," but the narrative comments often fail to provide sufficient information to make a clear distinction between the level of responsibility and performance of these officers. Frequently a very limited number of factors - such as the number (not quality) of recruitments, language skills or number of people supervised - must be relied upon in ranking officers.

B. RECOMMENDATION:

The Agency should conduct a review of the current fitness report system with a view towards abolishing letters grades and strengthening narrative comments. Such a revision should provide sufficient flexibility for the DO to meet its special evaluation needs. This would include post recruitment assessments to determine what long range benefit has accrued to the Directorate's mission within the Intelligence Community.

SECRET

SECRET

V. SUBJECT: General Discussion

This time has been allocated to permit further comment by the Director and the DDO/MAG on subjects raised during the discussion of agenda items as well as on new topics of current interest.

SECRET
12